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NOTES
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-

SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

-

SUBSTITUTION OF JUDGMENT

Plaintiff taxpayer built a large number of housing units
which were rented and later sold over a five-year period by the
taxpayer's staff. These undisputed facts were the basis of the
Tax Court's finding that the property was held "primarily for
sale to customers . . . in the ordinary course of business" and

therefore not within the capital gains provisions. On appeal,
the court of appeals held, reversed.' The finding of the Tax
Court was an ultimate fact conclusion, which is but a legal inference from the facts and therefore subject to review free of
the restraining impact of the "clearly erroneous" rule. The court
of appeals then freely substituted judgment on the issue. Curtiss
v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1956).
The distinction between law and fact is the overt basis of
the rules governing the scope of judicial review of administrative findings. Review is limited as to fact findings and unrestricted as to legal questions. The "substantial evidence" and
"rational basis" rules generally govern the scope of review. The

"substantial evidence" rule is applied in reviewing fact conclusions reached by an agency in the exercise of its adjudicative
function. 2 Under this rule, the court will not substitute its judgment for that of the agency on factual conclusions or inferences
which are supported by evidence which a reasonable person could
consider adequate,8 although other reasonable inferences could
be drawn from the evidence. 4 The "rational basis" criteria is
applied in reviewing agency conclusions of a rule-making na1. On a subsidiary issue

(whether certain lands were held for sale in the

ordinary course of business) the court affirmed the finding of the Tax Court
against the taxpayer.

A dissent did not disagree with the consideration of ulti-

mate fact as a legal question, but was based on the argument that statutory provisions granting special tax exemptions should be construed narrowly.
2. NLRB v. Nevada Consol. Copper Corp., 316 U.S. 105 (1942). But the
rule has also been employed where an inference was primarily in the nature of a

statutory construction.

O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, 340 U.S. 504 (1951).

The rule is intended to be applied to findings which are based primarily if not
completely on evidentiary considerations. It is interesting to note that the same
"substantial evidence" language is used in reviewing jury findings. See Notes to

Rules of Civil Procedure, 8A FED. CODE ANN. 402 (1947).
3. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).
4. NLRB v. Nevada Consol. Copper Corp., 316 U.S. 105 (1942).
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ture. 5 In such a case, the court will only look to see if the agency
finding has a "reasonable basis in law" and "warrant in the
record," 6 i.e., whether the specification of a rule is pursuant to
the statutory principle and delegated legislative authority. The
scope of review as to Tax Court findings is unique in the field of
administrative law in that neither the "substantial evidence" nor
the "rational basis" tests have any applicability. A broader 7 review is allowed under the rule that the courts may not disturb
findings of fact unless "clearly erroneous," '8 i.e., unless, on the
entire evidence, the court is left with the definite and firm conviction a mistake has been made.9
Originally, decisions of the old Board of Tax Appeals were
considered to be only guides to the courts.' 0 But in the Dobson
case," decided in 1943, the Supreme Court stated that review of
tax decisions had been too broad, and laid down a new rule for
reviewing findings of the board. Judicial substitution of judgment was precluded where a rational basis in law or warrant in
the record could be found. Unless the courts could find a clear
mistake of law, the Board of Tax Appeals decision was to be left
undisturbed. 2 The case involved what was in effect rule making
by statutory interpretation, since the finding prescribed a
method of accounting to be used in computing certain tax deductions, and therefore the rational basis criterion was seemingly
to be expected.
However, dissatisfaction with the Dobson rule resulted in a
1948 amendment to the Internal Revenue Code,' which provided
that decisions of the Tax Court should be reviewed in the same
manner and to the same extent as decisions of a district court in
cases tried without a jury. In thus subjecting Tax Court decisions to the "clearly erroneous" rule, Congress clearly intended
that Tax Court findings should not be afforded the same degree
5. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947) ; NLRB v. Hearst Publications,
322 U.S. 111 (1944) ; Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941) ; Rochester Tel. Corp.
v. United States, 307 U.S. 125 (1939).
6. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944).
7. The "clearly erroneous" rule allows the appellate court to draw inferences
different from those of the court below, even though the lower court's finding may
have been reasonable. See DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 914-15 (1951).
8. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1141(a) ; FED. R. CIv. P. 52(a).

9. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948).
10. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 879 (1951).

11. Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489 (1943).
12. Id. at 502; Paul, Dobson v. Commissioner: The Strange Ways of Law and
Fact, 57 HARV. L. REV. 753, 840 (1944).
13. 62 STAT. 991 (1948) ; INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1141(a).

1957]

NOTES

of finality as those of other administrative agencies. 14 Congress
thought that application of the "clearly erroneous" rule would
eliminate much of the confusion generated by the Dobson doctrine, 15 but application of the rule has varied tremendously in
cases that are almost identical.' Its application is determined by
the law-fact distinction, but a precise definition of where fact
ends and law begins is not to be found. 17 The problem is particularly vexing in mixed questions of law and fact, for the court
must either decide that a finding is law or fact, when in reality
it is both.' 8 Preoccupation with dialectical analysis of mixed
questions may prevent the more important study of the purpose
of the distinction, which is to determine in which cases the appellate courts should be free to substitute judgment.' 9
14. See Rice, Law, Fact and Taxes, 51 COLUM. L. REV. 439, 440-43 (1951).
15. Ibid.
16. The Ninth Circuit treats the questions of whether real estate was held in
the ordinary course of business as fact. Pacific Homes v; United States, 230 F.2d
755 (9th Cir. 1956) ; Homan v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1956) ; Cohn
v. Commissioner, 226 F.2d 22 (9th Cir. 1955). Accord in the Tenth, Eighth, and
Sixth Circuits. Dougherty v. Commissioner, 216 F.2d 110 (6th Cir. 1954) ; Dillon
v. Commissioner, 213 F.2d 218 (8th Cir. 1954) ; Home Co. v. Commissioner, 212
F.2d 637 (10th Cir. 1954). Contra in the Seventh and Fifth Circuits, which are
in accord with the Third Circuit's holding of the instant case. Smith v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1956); Goldberg v. Commissioner, 223 F.2d 709
(5th Cir. 1955) ; Galena Oaks v. Scofield, 218 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1954) ; Chicago
Title and Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 209 F.2d 773 (7th Cir. 1954). Nor has the
scope of review in non-tax administrative cases been certain, though somewhat
more capable of prediction. "The one statement that can be made with confidence about the applicability of the doctrine of Gray v. Powell is that sometimes
the Supreme Court applies it and sometimes it does not." DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
See also Schwartz, Gray v. Powell and the Scope of the Review,
LAw 893 (1951).
54 MicH. L. REV. 1 (1955).
17. But Congress apparently felt that the distinction was well settled and
that there was no need to define more precisely the scope of review. 94 CONG.
REc. 8501 (1948).
18. When statutory concepts are involved, the weakness of dialectical efforts
to analyze a mixed question as either law or fact is particularly apparent. In saying that certain property was "held for sale to customers in the ordinary course
of business," one may consider the conclusion as one of fact by contending that
such a finding by a jury would be considered fact or that it is merely an inference
from evidentiary facts. By an opposite approach, it can be said that a judge might
withhold the question from the jury or that it was an application of a statutory
concept necessarily involving the interpretation or construction of the statute.
19. In Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 671 (1944), Justice Frankfurter recognized this problem: "Thus, the conclusion that may appropriately be
drawn from the whole mass of evidence is not always the ascertainment of the
kind of "fact" that precludes consideration by this Court. . . . Particularly is
this so when a decision here for review cannot escape broadly social judgments.
. . . Deference properly due to the findings of a lower court does not preclude
the review here of such judgments. This recognized scope of appellate review is
usually differentiated from review of ordinary questions of fact by being called
review of a question of law, but that is often not an illuminating test and is never
self-executing." (Emphasis added.) Generally, the courts pay lip service to the
distinction without overtly stating that it may sometimes be a label instead of the
basis of an opinion in circumstances wherein the purely analytical approach fails
to meet the needs of the occasion. The major writers frankly reject the analytical
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The instant case represents a growing line of tax jurisprudence wherein some appellate courts, especially the Fifth Circuit, freely substitute judgment by considering an ultimate fact
conclusion as one of law. 20 However, other circuits, most notably
the Ninth, consistently reject this approach in the application of
the "clearly erroneous" rule.2 1 In the review of ultimate fact
in deference to the practical approach. For a compilation of leading authorities,
see DAVIS, ADMINISTATIVE LAW 876 (1951).
20. The Fifth Circuit treated ultimate fact conclusions as questions of law
and reversed the findings of the Tax Court or district court in the following cases.
Smith v. Commissioner, 262 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1956) ; Daniel and Dillar v. First
Nat'l Bank, 227 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1955), rehearing denied, 228 F.2d 803 (5th
Cir. 1956) ; Consolidated Naval'Stores Co. v. Fahs, 227 F.2d 923 (5th Cir. 1956) ;
Smith v. Dunn, 224 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1955); Goldberg v. Commissioner, 223
F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1955) ; Haley v. Commissioner, 203 F.2d 815 (5th Cir. 1953).
The court considered an ultimate fact as law but affirmed in Galena Oaks Corp.
v. Scofield, 218 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1954). The Seventh Circuit treated ultimate
fact conclusions as law and reversed in the following cases. Chandler v. United
States, 226 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1955) ; Jones v. Commissioner, 222 F.2d 891 (7th
Cir. 1955) ; Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. United States, 209 F.2d 773 (7th Cir.
1954). Contra, Fritz v. Jarecki, 189 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1951). The Sixth Circuit,
although it ordinarily treats ultimate conclusions as fact, has substituted judgment, considering the question as one of law, where the evidentiary facts were
not disputed. Shelton & Co. v. Commissioner, 214 F.2d 655 (6th Cir. 1954) ; Seagrove Corp. v. Mount, 212 F.2d 389 (6th Cir. 1954) (a non-tax case).
Accord, Philber Equipment Corp. v. Commissioner, 237 F.2d 129 (3d Cir.
1956)
District of Columbia v. 7-Up Washington, Inc., 214 F.2d 197 (D.C. Cir.
1954) ; Commissioner v. Smith, 203 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1953).
21. The Ninth Circuit tends to affirm ultimate fact conclusions of the Tax
Court or district court by considering them as findings of fact that are not "clearly
erroneous." Pacific Homes v. United States, 230 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1956) ; Cohn
v. Commissioner, 226 F.2d 22 (9th Cir. 1955) ; A.B.C. Brewing Corp. v. Commissioner, 224 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1955) ; Ward v. Commissioner, 224 F.2d 547 (9th
Cir. 1955) ; Dunn v. Commissioner, 220 F.2d 323 (9th Cir. 1955) ; Stockton Harbor Industrial Co. v. Commissioner, 216 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1954) ; Rollingwood
Corp. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 263 (9th Cir. 1951) ; Ruhino v. Commissioner,
186 F.2d 304 (9th Cir. 1951). But see McGah v. Commissioner, 210 F.2d 769
(9th Cir. 1954), where the court reversed an ultimate fact conclusion as a "clearly erroneous" fact finding, but added "we draw our own inferences from undisputed facts." But cf. I-lycon Mfg. Co. v. Kock and Sons, 219 F.2d 353 (9th Cir.
1955) (patent infringement case, wherein it was held that "the existence of the
basis of fact in documentary form or in agreed statements of the parties does not
transmute such propositions into questions of law.").
Tenth Circuit: Home Co. v. Commissioner, 212 F.2d 637 (10th Cir. 1954)
(finding favoring commissioner affirmed as not "clearly erroneous"); Friend v.
Commissioner, 198 F.2d 285 (10th Cir. 1952) (same treatment) ; Victory Housing.
v. Commissioner, 205 F.2d 371 (10th Cir. 1953) (reversed without reference to
law-fact or "clearly erroneous").
The Eighth Circuit reversed ultimate conclusions favoring the Commissioner
or Collector as "clearly erroneous" in Baltimore Dairy Lunch v. United States,
231 F.2d 870 (8th Cir. 1956); Greenspon v. Commissioner, 229 F.2d 947 (8th
Cir. 1956) ; Dillon v. Commissioner, 213 F.2d 218 (8th Cir. 1954). Ultimate fact
conclusions favoring the Commissioner were held not "clearly erroneous" in Scott
v. Self, 208 F.2d 125 (8th Cir. 1953) ; Rider v. Commissioner, 200 F.2d 524 (8th
Cir. 1952) ; Builders Steel Co. v. Commissioner, 197 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1952).
The Sixth Circuit affirmed ultimate fact conclusions favoring the Commissioner
as not "clearly erroneous" in Winnick v. Commissioner, 223 F.2d 266 (6th Cir.
1955) ; Dougherty v. Commissioner, 216 F.2d 110 (6th Cir. 1954), but reversed
as "clearly erroneous" in Thomas v. Commissioner, 223 F.2d 83 (6th Cir. 195.5).
While usually treating ultimate fact conclusions as findings of law, the Fifth
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inferences which are applications or constructions of statutory
terms by other administrative bodies, the courts generally do not
avoid the "substantial evidence" and "rational basis" tests by
classification as law in order to enable free substitution. 2 2 The
law classification approach, where used in reviewing tax cases is
not limited to cases tried before the Tax Courts, but has also been
applied where the courts of first instance were district courts.2

Supreme Court decisions are not decisive as to which classification should be used in reviewing ultimate fact inferences. 24 Indeed, they afford precedent for either approach. 25 Perhaps in
consideration of the purpose of the distinction, 26 the Supreme
Court has not seen fit to adhere to a hard and fast line. To explain those cases wherein substitution is freely accomplished by
Circuit has also considered such inferences as factual and affirmed them. Archer
v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 270 (5th Cir. 1956) ; Roscoe v. Commissioner, 215 F.2d
478 (5th Cir. 1954) ; Mabee Petroleum Corp. v. United States, 203 F.2d 872 (5th
Cir. 1953) Broford-Toothaker Tractor Co. v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 633 (5th
Cir. 1951) ; King v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1951). But the court
has also reversed under the "clearly erroneous" rule. Ross v. Commissioner, 227
F.2d 265 (5th Cir. 1955) ; Benton v. Commissioner, 197 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1952).
An analysis of these cases shows that the intent of the parties or the credibility
of the witnesses were major factors leading to the fact classification in all but the
Roscoe, Mabee, and Archer decisions, which are better explained by the court's
strong agreement with the findings and a desire for simplicity in the explanation
of substantively desirable affirmation.
The Fourth Circuit has treated the question in the same manner as the Ninth.
Rongleau v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1952).
22. E.g., O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, 340 U.S. 504 (1951) ; SEC v.
Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947). But see SEC v. Central Illinois Securities
Corp., 338 U.S. 96 (1949). See also note 16 supra.
23. Chandler v. United States, 226 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1955) ; Smith v. Dunn,
224 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1955) ; Galena Oaks v. Scofield, 218 F.2d 217 (5th Cir.
1954); Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. United States, 209 F.2d 773 (7th Cir.
1954) Fritz v. Jarecki, 189 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1951).
24. Language in Corn Products v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46, 51 (1956),
suggests that the holding of the instant case is incorrect. In affirming concurrent
findings below that grain held for hedging purposes was not "property" within
the meaning of the capital gains provisions, the court said "on essentially factual
questions the findings of two courts below should not ordinarily be disturbed."
While thus calling the finding factual, the court employed statutory interpretation techniques. The strength of the ease is lessened even more by the concurrence
of the lower courts, and the qualifications "essentially" and "ordinarily." See
also Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949).
25. Prior to the 1948 amendment introducing Rule 52(a) to Tax Court review,
the Supreme Court generally followed the Dobson doctrine by considering mixed
questions as factual. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948);
Bagley v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737 (1947); Kelly Co. v. Commissioner, 326
U.S. 521 (1946). Some pre-Dobson cases are contra: Bogardus v. Commissioner,
302 U.S. 34 (1937) ; Helvering v. Tex-Penn Oil Co., 300 U.S. 481 (1936). See
note 16 supra on the inconsistent review of non-tax administrative cases. The
courts of appeal that consider ultimate fact as a legal inference have found strong
support in non-administrative cases. Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S.
665 (1944); Graver Tank and Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products, 336 U.S. 271
(1949). But cf. O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, 340 U.S. 504 (1951) (workmen's compensation case).
26. See note 19 supra.
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classifying an ultimate fact conclusion as law, one must examine
underlying factors. The instant case is susceptible of explanation
on such a basis. One factor appears to be a Court of Appeals
attitude of statutory interpretation favoring the taxpayer. 27 Tax
Court decisions arising for review by the appellate courts are
usually unfavorable to the taxpayer, 28 and therefore prompt free
substitution of judgment, as in the instant case, where a statutory interpretation contrary to that of the Tax Court prevailed
on appeal. The absence of dispute as to the basic facts precluded
the argument against free substitution that the court which
heard the witnesses was best qualified to draw inferences from
conflicting facts.2 The subject matter was not so highly technical that it would discourage substituting judgment on the opinion of an expert body. 0 The application of a statutory concept
made it reasonable to contend that the judicial function of statutory interpretation was involved. 1 The factual situation and the
issue of the case arise with great frequency, 2 a characteristic
that would motivate treatment as law so as to give the case
greater precedent value. 3 But these same factors are present in
those circuits, which unlike the Third Circuit Court's holding in
the instant case, consider ultimate fact inferences as questions
of fact. It is interesting to note again that fact classification is
usually a concomitant of non-substitution, 4 whereas law classification almost uniformly precedes full substitution and reversal.8 5 Are different views as to what is analytically law responsible for the difference among the circuits in the scope of
review over ultimate fact conclusions? Or do variant views as to
27. This is suggested by the very frequency and near uniformity with which
findings of an ultimate fact nature that have been freely reviewed as law have

been reversed, and decisions rendered in favor of the taxpayer. See note 20 supra.
But see note 21 supra. Language in Pacific Homes v. United States, 230 F.2d 755
(9th Cir. 1956) illustrates the different attitude of the leader of the "fact" school
of circuits, the Ninth. "The sovereign is not to be frustrated in the replenishment
of its fisc by the finespun arguments of the appellant."
28. See notes 20 and 21 supra.
29. Cf. Great A & P Tea Co. v. Supermarket, 340 U.S. 147 (1950). Even the
Ninth Circuit, while sticking to the fact classification, has stated: "We draw our
own inferences from undisputed facts." McGah v. Commissioner, 210 F.2d 769
(9th Cir. 1954). But cf. Hycon Mfg. Co. v. Kock and Sons, 219 F.2d 353 (9th
Cir. 1955) (non-tax case).
30. Cf. American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 112 (1946).
31. Cf. FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 427 (1920).
32. See note 16 supra.
33. Cf. Commissioner v. Scottish American Inv. Co., 323 U.S. 119, 125 (1944)
Rice, Law, Fact and Taxes, 51 COLUM. L. REv. 439, 472 (1951).
34. The Eighth Circuit cases are the most notable exception to this statement.
The Ninth and Fifth Circuit treatment of "fact" findings best illustrates it. See
note 21 supra.
35. See note 20 supra.
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the weight of factors pressing for substitution of judgment determine whether a mixed question will be considered one of law?
Since the "clearly erroneous" rule provides a large margin
for substitution of judgment,88 and in view of the relative
87
paucity of substitution that accompanies fact classification, it
is submitted that variant views as to the weight of factors pressing for substitution of judgment afford the most logical explanation of the inconsistency between circuits. Different attitudes
as to the construction of statutory tax provisions appear to be
the most important inarticulate factor.38 Classification of ultimate fact inferences as law limits the application of the "clearly
erroneous" rule to inferences of an evidentiary nature, such as
questions of intent, time, place, etc. Law classification leaves
the court absolutely free to substitute judgment on inferences
which are primarily extensions of tax statutes through interpretative rule making. With respect to this aspect of the instant
case, the writer feels that in effectively repealing the rule of the
Dobson case, which had afforded the Tax Court rule-making
authority, Congress intended that the interpretative rule-making
authority under tax statutes should be vested in the courts and
therefore law classification is correct.3 9 The broadness of the
"clearly erroneous" rule also suggests that classification as law
is unnecessary to accomplish substitution of judgment in cases
of rule making by interpretation. 4 However, if consistency in
statutory construction is desired, control through legal precedent
could be an objective affording further explanation. 41 Simplicity
in explaining substantively desirable substitution also seems important. 42 It is unlikely that ultimate fact conclusions will be
widely treated as law in non-tax administrative decisions, 43 for
36. See note 7 supra. The lack of any one-sided pattern in the Eighth Circuit
is also illustrative. See note 21 supra.
37. See notes 21 and 34 supra.
38. The Fifth Circuit very frequently reverses decisions against the taxpayer
and is quick to classify mixed questions as law in so doing. The Ninth Circuit
almost invariably sustains the Tax Court findings as factual and not "clearly
erroneous"; the decisions are generally unfavorable to the taxpayer. See notes 20,
21, and 27 supra.
39. See note 14 supra and text discussion. But the liberal interpretation of
exclusionary tax provisions is questionable. See the dissent in Smith v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 142, 171 (5th Cir. 1956), and cases cited therein.
40. See note 20 supra.
41. See note 33 supra.
42. Illustrative of this point are those cases wherein the Fifth Circuit affirmed
ultimate fact conclusions as not "clearly erroneous." See note 21 supra. See also
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 907 (1951).

43. Although the dissent in Ferenz v. Folsom, 237 F.2d 46 (3d Cir. 1956)
pointed to the instant case as precedent, the court held that an ultimate infer-
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the factors favoring such treatment are not prevalent, and there
are weighty factors against it. 44 But the growing line of tax
jurisprudence represented by the instant case provides considerable precedent for freedom of review if inarticulated considerations should call for it.
Frederick W. Ellis
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -

DUE PROCESS -

BLOOD TEST

The truck petitioner was driving collided with an automobile
on a New Mexico highway. Three occupants of the automobile
were killed and petitioner was seriously injured. He was taken
to a hospital where a physician rembved a sample of his blood
at the request of a state patrolman. The blood sample was taken
with a hypodermic needle while petitioner was unconscious. Over
his objection, evidence of this blood test, showing that petitioner
was under the influence of alcohol, was introduced at his trial.
After his conviction of involuntary manslaughter, the Supreme
Court of New Mexico denied a writ of habeas corpus. On certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States held, affirmed.
Petitioner's conviction, based on the result of the involuntary
blood test, did not deprive him of his liberty without that due
process of law guaranteed him by the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution.' Breithauptv. Abram, 77 Sup. Ct. 408 (1957).
It has long been settled that the due process provision of the
Fourteenth Amendment does not incorporate the Federal Bill of
Rights 2 as restrictions upon the powers of the states.3 On the
ence of the Social Security Administrator was factual, although involving broad
statutory terms.
44. Many administrative agencies clearly possess delegated legislative authority, whereas Congress, in creating the "clearly erroneous" rule, apparently intended
that the Tax Court should not have such authority. The expertise argument (favoring non-substitution on highly technical questions), while often present in tax
matters, is more clearly and consistently present in reviewing the findings of such
agencies as the ICC, FCC, and SEC. The strong precedent of such cases as
O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, 340 U.S. 504 (1951) (statutory construction
of ultimate fact inferences considered fact and subject to substantial evidence rule)
would discourage any large scale law classification under the substantial evidence
rule.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1: "All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I-VIII.
3. See concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 59 (1947).

